In Rome on Feb 3--4, experts from the WHO, UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and Office International des Epizooties (OIE, or World Organisation for Animal Health) met to discuss a targeted strategy to control avian influenza. Among the recommendations to emerge from the meeting was that vaccination should be considered for at-risk poultry in situations where mass culling is neither desirable nor feasible. The experts concluded that the current Asian outbreak of H5N1 influenza probably originated in wild or domestic bird reservoirs and spread as a consequence of a failure of surveillance, early warning, and control of movement of infected domestic poultry. Indeed, a scan of the alert messages on the OIE website suggests that avian influenza was detected in domestic hens in Indonesia in mid December 2003---ie, before it was detected in Vietnam (see page 128)---but was not reported to OIE until early February.

Avian influenza is just one of a host of recent examples of infectious diseases emerging from wild animals and spreading to human beings, often with domesticated animals also affected. News items in this issue report on the severe acute respiratory (SARS) coronavirus, for which civets are the likely source (pages 131, 134), and Ebola virus, with great apes probably being the source of human infection (page 133). In the USA alone in the past 4 years, West Nile virus emerged in the wild bird and equine populations and hence spread to people, and monkeypox arrived in a shipment of rodents from west Africa. What is becoming increasingly obvious is that wild animals are the most likely source of new emerging infectious diseases that put at risk the health of human beings livestock. So who is responsible for providing the type of surveillance of infectious diseases in wild animals that might give early warning of a threat to human health?

In the USA, in addition to state agencies, federal government bodies involved in surveillance of infectious diseases in wild animals include the Veterinary Services of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services, Department of Agriculture; the National Wildlife Health Center, US Geological Survey; and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Part of the CDC\'s approach to integrating surveillance of human and animal health is described by Julie Gerberding in this issue (page 179). These agencies are engaged in surveillance for---among many other zoonoses---West Nile virus, rabies, and chronic wasting disease. Across the border, Canada runs a nationwide system for surveillance of wildlife diseases.

In Europe, despite a European Union directive, few countries conduct wildlife disease surveillance in a systematic fashion. However, in the UK, the Veterinary Laboratories Agency has since 1998 run the Diseases of Wildlife Surveillance Scheme. Surveillance for West Nile virus in British birds is among the activities conducted under this scheme. The similar French "Sagir" system has operated since 1986.

National organisations are supposed to pass on reports to OIE, which publishes weekly, monthly, and annual syntheses of data. OIE also runs a world animal health information system, part of which is a procedure designed to alert member countries to exceptional events. However, reporting to OIE by member nations appears patchy---for example, the 2002 annual report of wild animal diseases contains not a single entry from China or Thailand. Hopefully, the lessons of SARS and avian influenza will have sunk in and we can expect for more openness from these countries in future. A project to survey civets and other small mammals in China and neighbouring countries for infectious diseases has begun, but in a part of the world where a large mammal could remain unknown to science until the 1990s (the saola found in Vietnam in 1992), trying to get a picture of infectious diseases in wild animals will be a Herculean task.

Much like surveillance of human infectious diseases, the attention given to diseases of wild animals seems to depend on the resources that a country can afford. Nevertheless, many countries in Europe could certainly afford to be more systematic than they are in their surveillance efforts. With the examples of SARS and avian influenza to force the issue, OIE and WHO should be more proactive in persuading countries to contribute to a more complete global picture of infectious diseases in wild animals. SARS will not be the last time that an infectious disease emerges without warning from wild animals. The systems must be in place for rapid and systematic surveillance anywhere in the world the next time such an event occurs.
